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Several years ago we began an international project to study the relationship 
between social security program provisions and retirement. Under pay-  as-
  you-  go social security systems, most developed countries have made prom-
ises they cannot keep. The systems in their current forms are not ﬁ  nancially 
sustainable. What caused the problem? It has been common to assume that 
the problem was caused by aging populations. The number of older persons 
has increased very rapidly relative to the number of younger persons and 
this trend will continue. Thus, the proportion of retirees has increased rela-
tive to the number of employed persons who must pay for the beneﬁ  ts of 
those who are retired. In addition, persons are living longer so that those 
who reach retirement age are receiving beneﬁ  ts longer than they used to. The 
eﬀect of aging populations and increasing longevity has been compounded 
by another trend: until recently, older persons had been leaving the labor 
force at younger and younger ages, further increasing the ratio of retirees to 
employed persons. What has not been widely appreciated is that the provi-
sions of social security programs themselves often provide strong incentives 
to leave the labor force. By penalizing work, social security systems magnify 
the increased ﬁ  nancial burden caused by aging populations and thus con-
tribute to their own insolvency.
Why countries introduced plan provisions that encouraged older persons 
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to leave the labor force is unclear. After the fact, it is now often claimed 
that these provisions were introduced to provide more jobs for the young, 
assuming that fewer older persons in the labor force would open up more job 
opportunities for the young. In some cases this may have been a motivation 
for the provisions but in other instances it was not, as shown by illustra-
tions presented following. Now, the same reasoning is also often used to 
argue against eﬀorts in the same countries to reduce or eliminate the incen-
tives for older persons to leave the labor force, claiming that the consequent 
increase in the employment of older persons would reduce the employment 
of younger persons. Here are a few examples:
•    “The Job Release Scheme is a measure which allows older workers to 
retire early in order to release jobs for the registered unemployed.” (The 
United Kingdom 1977 Labour Government)
•    “We will extend the voluntary Job Release Scheme to men over 60 so 
that those who want to retire early vacate jobs for those who are cur-
rently unemployed. This could take as many as 160,000 people out of 
unemployment and into work.” (The United Kingdom 1987 Labour 
Party manifesto)
•    “And I would like to speak to the elders, to those who have spent their 
lifetime working in this region, and well, I would like them to show the 
way, that life must change; when it is time to retire, leave the labor force 
in order to provide jobs for your sons and daughters. That is what I ask 
you. The Government makes it possible for you to retire at age 55. Then 
retire, with one’s head held high, proud of your worker’s life. This is 
what we are going to ask you . . . This is the “contrat de solidarité” [an 
early retirement scheme available to those ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and over who quit 
their job]. That those who are the oldest, those who have worked, leave 
the labor force, release jobs so that everyone can have a job.” (France: 
Pierre Mauroy, French Prime Minister, in Lille 27th September 1981, 
quoted in Gaullier (1982), L’avenir à reculons, 230)
•    “The lowering of the retirement age strengthens the positive eﬀects on 
employment that early retirement policies made possible. It even widens 
these positive eﬀects as a larger share of the population is concerned.” 
(France: Ministry of Employment, in La retraite à 60 ans, Droit social 
no4—avril 1983)
•    “Unemployment among the youth is perhaps the most serious problem 
of today, because we cannot hide from the fact that we risk losing a whole 
generation of young persons from the labour market and from society 
as a whole.” (Denmark, with respect to the Post Employment Wage: The 
Minister of Labour, Svend Auken, Proceedings of Parliament, 1978)
The validity of such claims is addressed in this volume. It presents the results 
of analyses of the relationship between the labor force participation of older 
persons and the labor force participation of younger persons in twelve coun-
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This is the fourth phase of the ongoing project. The ﬁ  rst phase described 
the retirement incentives inherent in plan provisions and documented the 
strong relationship across countries between social security incentives to 
retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force (Gruber 
and Wise 1999). The second phase, based on microeconomic analysis of the 
relationship between a person’s decision to retire and the program incentives 
faced by that person, documented the large eﬀects that changing plan provi-
sions would have on the labor force participation of older workers (Gruber 
and Wise 2004). The third phase demonstrated the consequent ﬁ  scal impli-
cations that extending labor force participation would have on net program 
costs—reducing government social security beneﬁ  t payments and increasing 
government tax revenues (Gruber and Wise 2007). The analyses in the ﬁ  rst 
two phases, as well as the analysis in the third phase, are summarized in the 
introduction to the third phase.
The results of the ongoing project are the product of analyses conducted 
for each country by analysts in that country. Researchers who have par-
ticipated in the project are in the following list. The authors of the country 
papers in this volume are listed ﬁ  rst; others who have participated in one or 
more of the ﬁ  rst three phases are listed second and shown in italics.
Belgium   Alain  Jousten,  Mathieu  Lefèbvre,  Sergio  Perelman, 
Pierre Pestieau, Raphaël Desmet, Arnaud Dellis, and 
Jean- Philippe  Stijns
Canada    Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
Denmark    Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. Pe-
dersen
France    Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, 
Muriel Roger, Ronan Mahieu, Louis-  Paul Pelé, and 
Em manuelle  Walraet
Germany    Axel Börsch-  Supan, Reinhold Schnabel, Simone 
Kohnz, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni
Italy  Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
Japan    Takashi Oshio, Satoshi Shimizutani, Akiko Sato Oi-
shi, and Naohiro Yashiro
Netherlands  Adriaan Kalwij, Arie Kapteyn, and Klaas de Vos
Spain    Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-  Martín, Pilar Garcia 
Gomez, and Franco Peracchi
Sweden  Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
United Kingdom    James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, Carl 
Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Costas Meghir, and Sarah 
Smith
United States   Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, Courtney Coile, and 
Peter Diamond
An important goal of the project has been to present results that were as 
comparable as possible across countries. Thus, the papers for each phase 4        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
were prepared according to a detailed template that we prepared in consulta-
tion with country participants.
In this introduction, we summarize the collective results of the country 
analyses. In large part, the results presented in the introduction could only be 
conveyed by combined analysis of the data from each of the countries. The 
country papers themselves present much more detail for each country and, 
in addition to template analyses performed by each country, often present 
country- speciﬁ   c  analysis  relevant  to  a  particular  country.
The proposition that more work by older persons reduces the job oppor-
tunities for younger persons is put forth in many diﬀerent forms. It is some-
times referred to by economists as the “lump of labor” theory. Taken liter-
ally, this statement of the theory says that if an additional older worker is 
employed, one younger worker must be displaced. The implication is that 
economies are boxed and that the box cannot be enlarged.
In this volume, we emphasize the relationship between the employment 
rate of older persons and the unemployment and employment rates of 
younger persons, youth in particular. We emphasize employment and unem-
ployment rates because public discourse about the relationship is typically 
in terms of these rates—that the unemployment rate of youth, for example, 
will be increased if incentives for older persons to leave the labor force are 
eliminated.
The Context
At ﬁ  rst glance, it seems clear that economies are not boxed. The ﬂ  ow of 
women into the labor force in the past few decades has increased the size 
of the labor force enormously in many countries. For example, the number 
of women in the labor force in the United States increased by almost 48 
million between 1960 and 2007, from about 34 percent to 46 percent of the 
labor force. But the employment rate of men changed little as the propor-
tion of women employed increased. Figure 1 shows the percent change in 
the employment rate of men compared to the percent increase in the female 
employment rate in the twelve countries participating in this project. In this 
ﬁ  gure, the number of years over which the change occurred varies from coun-
try to country. The longest period is from 1960 to 2006 (in Germany) and 
the shortest from 1983 to 2004 (in Belgium). Two features of the data stand 
out. First, there was a small decline in the employment rate of men over this 
time period in all but one of the countries, but second, on average, the small-
est of the small declines were in the countries with the largest increase in the 
employment rate for women. For example, in the Netherlands, the employ-
ment rate of women increased by 54 percentage points, but the employment 
rate of men declined by only 1 percentage point. Very similar results are 
obtained if the same span of years is used for all countries—1983 to 2004.
The results are summarized more succinctly in ﬁ  gure 2 that compares the Introduction and Summary    5
six countries with the smallest to the six countries with the largest increase in 
the employment rate of women. The results are shown both for the variable-
 years version and the same- years version. The smallest of the small decreases 
in the employment of men are in the countries with the greatest increase in 
the employment rate of women. For example, for the same years (1983 to 
2003) the average increase in the employment rate of women was 23 percent-
age points in the countries with the greatest increase and in these countries 
the decline in the employment rate of men was only 2 percentage points. On 
Fig. 1    Relationship between the increase in female employment rates and change in 
male employment rates, years vary by country
Fig. 2    Compare the six countries with smallest increase with the six with the great-
est increase in female employment, variable and same years6        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
the other hand, the average increase in the employment rate of women was 
only 6 percentage points in the countries with the smallest increase in the 
employment rate of women and the decline in the employment rate of men in 
these countries was 4 percentage points. It seems clear that the small decline 
in the employment rate of men was not tied to the increase in the employ-
ment of women. The boxed economy proposition seems quite inconsistent 
with these data. Could there be another relationship between the old and 
the young? That is the question we address in this volume.
The Country Papers and the Data
Each of the country papers begins with an historical summary of the 
changes in social security program provisions over the past three or four 
decades. The key question is whether social security plan provisions, which 
provide incentives for older persons to leave the labor force, were prompted 
by concerns about youth unemployment in particular. The evidence is based 
on a review of legislation, press coverage, and other public discussion pre-
ceding program changes. The evidence gained in this way is further checked 
against corresponding empirical evidence. For each country, the relationship 
between the timing of program reforms and the trends in the employment of 
older persons and the employment and unemployment of youth is described 
graphically. For example, if public discussion suggests the program changes 
may have been prompted by increasing youth unemployment, does the data 
show an increase in youth unemployment prior to the program reform?
The reason for emphasizing the extent to which the program provisions 
(which induce older persons to leave the labor force) were prompted by youth 
unemployment is to help to interpret the key relationships that are estimated 
in the country papers, as explained later. The core analyses presented in each 
of the country papers are regression estimates of the relationship between 
the employment rates of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four on the one hand, 
and the employment and unemployment of youth twenty to twenty-  four 
and prime age persons twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four on the other hand. Several 
diﬀerent estimation speciﬁ  cations of these relationships are presented.
These estimates follow on the estimates in previous phases of the project. 
As noted before, the ﬁ  rst phase of the project documented the strong rela-
tionship across countries between program provisions that induce retirement 
and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force. The second phase 
was based on micro-  estimation of the relationship between the retirement 
incentives faced by individuals and their retirement decisions. The central 
ﬁ  nding is the strong relationship between social security program provisions 
that penalize work and departure from the labor force. Now, the question 
is whether the departure of older persons from the labor force expands the 
job opportunities of youth.
The trends in the employment of older persons, however, reﬂ  ect all deter-Introduction and Summary    7
1. In Sweden the data for youth are for the age range sixteen to twenty-  four.
2. The adjustment in the United States, Japan, Spain, and Sweden is based on GDP per 
capita and GDP growth only because the proportion of GDP generated by manufacturing is 
not available in all years for these countries.
minants of the employment of older persons, not only the social security 
program incentives to leave the labor force. Thus, in addition to the template 
components of the country analyses that are common to each of the coun-
try papers, a few of the country papers also present additional information 
that helps to explain the developments in that country. For example, while 
the estimates (of the “direct” eﬀect of the employment of the old on the 
employment of the young) are the central focus of the analysis in this phase, 
we have also considered whether it was feasible to estimate the relationship 
between changes over time in the incentives inherent in social security plan 
provisions and the employment of the young. The reason for considering 
this question was to address more directly the eﬀects of plan provisions that 
are the subject of public discussion. This goal turned out to be very diﬃcult 
to accomplish on a comparable basis across countries. In particular, we were 
unable, on a consistent basis across countries, to obtain a reliable measure 
of the average incentives faced by persons retired in a given year. Perhaps 
most important, even if the average were measured well, the average may 
not adequately capture the wide range of incentives faced by individuals. In 
short, the procedure we explored was not replicable across countries. Thus, 
such estimates are presented in only a few of the country papers.
The illustrations and the cross-  country analyses presented in this intro-
duction are based on data provided by each country. Key data series are 
shown here. Much of the answer to the central question posed in this volume 
can be seen in the data themselves.
Figures 3 to 14 show the data for each country. The ﬁ  rst panel of each 
ﬁ  gure shows the actual data for three series—the employment of persons 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four (E 55–  64), the employment of youth twenty to twenty-
 four (E 20– 24), and the unemployment of youth twenty to twenty- four (UE 
20– 24).1 To simplify the ﬁ  gures, we have not shown data for prime age per-
sons (age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four). The employment and unemployment 
rates for the prime age group typically parallel closely the rates of youth 
and both series are shown in the country papers. In the analysis following 
we present results for prime age persons, as well as for youth.
The following ﬁ  gures show two versions of the data for each country. 
The ﬁ  rst panel shows the actual data as reported for each country. The sec-
ond panel shows the data adjusted for changes in gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, GDP growth, and the proportion of GDP generated by 
manufacturing.2 The years for which data are available varies from country 
to country. The longest period is from 1960 to 2006 (in Germany) and the 
shortest period from 1983 to 2004 (in Belgium).
To obtain the adjusted data for a given country, we ﬁ  rst determine how 8        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
each of the three employment series varies with GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, and the “manufacturing share” in that country. Then beginning 
with the ﬁ  rst year of data for that country, the data for each subsequent year 
is adjusted based on the change in the predictor variables between the ﬁ  rst 
year and the subsequent year. The same procedure is followed for each of the 
countries. (The details are shown in the appendix.) Thus, the adjusted series 
eliminates the movement in each of the series that can be predicted by the 
change over time in the adjustment variables in that country. In particular, 
each of the employment series is adjusted for macroeconomic shocks to the 
economy that tend to aﬀect each of the series. Of course, the employment 
Fig. 3    Belgium: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
A
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3. For example, in France there was a change in the Labor Force Survey in 2002 and a change 
in the work week schedule in 2000.
series may be aﬀected by other inﬂ  uences imperfectly controlled for by the 
adjustment variables. Some such inﬂ  uences are mentioned in the country 
papers.3
In the subsequent analyses, we often show results based on both unad-
justed and adjusted data. Both are shown for two reasons. One is that we 
often want to observe youth employment or unemployment rates prior to a 
given reform in a country. For this purpose we want to use the unadjusted 
data. The second reason is that it is not clear that estimates based on the 
Fig. 4    Canada: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
A
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adjusted data always yield the best estimate of the eﬀect of employment of 
the old on the employment of the young.
In addition, prolonged upward and downward trends in the employment 
of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four are marked by left-  right arrows in each 
of the ﬁ  gures. The arrows’ positions are determined on the basis of the 
unadjusted data and are in the same positions on the adjusted data ﬁ  gures. 
These prolonged upward and downward intervals are used in subsequent 
analysis.
Three features of the data stand out. First, in each country, the unadjusted 
data show substantial correlation among the series. As might be expected, 
the employment of youth is positively correlated with the employment of 
Fig. 5    Germany: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, 
Adjusted data
A
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older persons. The unemployment of youth is negatively correlated with the 
employment of older persons. That is, macro “shocks” to the economy aﬀect 
employment at all ages and in the same direction. Second, the variation over 
time in each of the series is typically reduced when the change associated 
with economic output per capita is controlled for. In some countries, the 
smoothing of the series trends is substantial. Third, and most important for 
our analysis, even after adjusting for economic growth and the manufactur-
ing share, much of the relationship between the employment of the old and 
the young remains.
Simple perusal of the data reveals no evidence that increases in the 
Fig. 6    Denmark: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, 
Adjusted data
B
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employment of older persons are related to a reduction in the employment 
of younger persons, or that decreases in the employment of older persons 
are associated with increases in the unemployment of younger persons.
We next consider a series of estimates of the relationship between the 
employment of older persons and the employment of youth and we show 
key results for prime age persons as well. In section 3 we begin by showing 
how the tax force to retire—emphasized in the ﬁ  rst phase of the project—
is related to the employment of youth and prime age persons. In section 4 
we show illustrative within- country “natural experiment” comparisons that 
help to demonstrate the relationship between within-  country reforms and 
Fig. 7    Spain: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
B
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the consequent changes in the employment of the old on the one hand, and 
changes in the employment of the young on the other hand. In section 5, 
we show cross- country comparisons based on various comparison methods. 
To simplify the presentations in sections 4 and 5 we show results only for 
youth. In section 6, we show more formal estimates based on panel regres-
sion analysis. In this section we show estimates for prime age persons, as 
well as for youth. As it turns out, all of the various estimation methods yield 
very consistent results. In particular, there is no evidence that reducing the 
employment of older persons provides more job opportunities for younger 
persons. And, there is no evidence that increasing the labor force participa-
Fig. 8    France: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
B
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tion of older persons reduces the job opportunities of younger persons. In 
section 7 we summarize the results.
The Employment of Youth and the Tax Force to Retire
We begin by recalling the key ﬁ  nding from the ﬁ  rst phase of the project 
in which we considered the “tax force to retire.” The tax force to retire can 
be explained in this way: compensation for working another year, say at age 
sixty, can be divided into two parts—the wage earnings for an additional 
year of work and the change in the present value of future social security 
Fig. 9    Italy: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
B
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beneﬁ  ts. One might suppose that if beneﬁ  ts will be received for one fewer 
years, then annual beneﬁ  ts will be increased enough to oﬀset their receipt 
of one fewer years. This is typically not the case, however. The present value 
of beneﬁ  ts declines in most countries. In some countries, the reduction in 
beneﬁ  ts is greater than 80 percent of wage earnings. We then consider the 
sum of these percents (the ratio of the loss in beneﬁ  ts to wage earnings) from 
the early retirement age in a country to age sixty-  nine. We call this sum the 
tax force to retire.
The relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of 
men ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve to sixty- ﬁ  ve was shown in the summary to the Phase I volume 
Fig. 10    Japan: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
B
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(Gruber and Wise 1999). One version of that relationship is reproduced as 
ﬁ  gure 15. The strong relationship between the tax force to retire and the 
proportion of older men out of the labor force is apparent.
If the incentives that reduced the proportion of older persons in the labor 
force—that is, increased the proportion out of the labor force—increase the 
job opportunities of young persons, then the tax force to retire should be 
related to youth employment. The greater the tax force to retire, the lower 
youth unemployment should be and the greater youth employment should 
be. And analogous relationships should be true for prime age persons. But 
this is not the case.
Fig. 11    Netherlands: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; 
B, Adjusted data
A
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Figure 16 is the same as ﬁ  gure 15 but with the addition of the unemploy-
ment rate of young men twenty to twenty-  four. Essentially there is no rela-
tionship across countries between the tax force for older persons to retire and 
the unemployment of young men. Indeed, the actual relationship is slightly 
positive—the greater the tax force to retire the greater is youth unemploy-
ment.
Figure 17 shows the unemployment rate of all youth, male and female 
combined. Again, there is a slightly positive relationship between the tax 
force to induce older persons to leave the labor force and the unemployment 
rate of youth twenty to twenty-  four.
Fig. 12    Sweden: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; B, Ad-
justed data
A
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Figure 18 shows the relationship between the tax force for older persons 
to leave the labor force and the employment of youth twenty to twenty- four. 
If inducing older persons to leave the labor force provides more jobs for the 
young, then the tax force to retire—which is strongly related to the propor-
tion of older persons out of the labor force—should also be strongly related 
to the employment of youth. But in fact the opposite is true. The greater the 
tax force to retire, the lower the employment rate of youth.
Figures 19 and 20 show the relationship between the tax force for older 
persons to leave the labor force and the unemployment and employment of 
Fig. 13    United Kingdom: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted 
data; B, Adjusted data
A
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prime age persons twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four. Like the results for youth, the 
greater the tax force to retire the greater the unemployment and the lower 
the employment of prime age persons twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four.
In short, these results provide no evidence that inducing older persons to 
leave the labor force frees up jobs for the young. If anything, the opposite is 
true; paying for old persons to leave the labor force reduces the employment 
rate and increases the unemployment rate of youth and of persons in their 
prime age working years.
Fig. 14    United States: Employment of the old and the young: A, Unadjusted data; 
B, Adjusted data
B
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Fig. 15    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force
Fig. 16    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force, men 
twenty to twenty-  four unemployed (1995)
Within-  Country Estimates of the Relationship between 
the Employment of the Old and the Young
In many instances it is possible to trace employment trends for both young 
and older workers that preceded a social security reform in a country and 
then to trace the eﬀect of the reform on the labor force participation of older Introduction and Summary    2 1
workers and, in turn, the relationship between the eﬀect on older workers 
and the eﬀect on younger workers. Several such illustrations are presented 
here. The illustrations serve two important purposes. The ﬁ  rst reason is 
simply to demonstrate—as we have in prior phases of the project—the 
eﬀects of reform on the labor force participation of older workers, and then 
to show the corresponding eﬀect on younger persons.
Fig. 17    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force, youth 
twenty to twenty-  four unemployed (1995)
Fig. 18    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force, youth 
twenty to twenty-  four employed (1995)22        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
The second reason to present the illustrations is to help to judge the extent 
to which the further results shown following are aﬀected by an important 
issue that complicates estimation of the causal relationship between employ-
ment of the old and the young. Suppose—as is now often claimed—that 
the program provisions that induced older persons to leave the labor force 
were prompted by increasing youth unemployment. In this case, a decline 
Fig. 19    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force, prime 
age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four unemployed (1995)
Fig. 20    Tax force to retire, men ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve out of the labor force, prime 
age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four employed (1995)Introduction and Summary    2 3
in youth unemployment following the introduction of retirement incentives 
could simply have been a continuation of the preincentive decline, and not 
caused by the incentive-  induced decline in the employment of older per-
sons. To address this issue, we have selected some examples in which speciﬁ  c 
reforms were apparently not prompted by concerns about youth unemploy-
ment (or employment). We call these “natural experiment” or sometimes 
“natural experiment like” examples. We want examples where the reform 
that induced older persons to leave the labor force was “exogenous.” That 
is, not motivated by the employment or unemployment of youth. Or, we 
want examples that are not contaminated by the “endogeneity” problem. 
There is no sure way to correct for the problem, to the extent that it exists. 
But, as comparison with subsequent results show, the “natural experiment” 
results—that are not contaminated by endogeneity—are very similar to 
the ﬁ  ndings from comparisons in which we are less sure of the extent of 
endogeneity. Thus, the fact that later results are much like the ﬁ  ndings from 
these and other natural experiments lends credence to the results obtained 
by other estimation methods.
We have emphasized the “endogeneity” issue. The natural experiment 
illustrations also address an additional and closely related issue. Economic 
shocks to the economy are likely to induce parallel movements in both the 
employment of the old and the employment of the young. We would like to 
evaluate the eﬀect of precipitating events that are intended to induce older 
persons to leave the labor force, without a contemporaneous inﬂ  uence on the 
employment of the young– unlike macro economic shocks that tend to aﬀect 
both simultaneously. The following illustrations also avoid the confounding 
eﬀect of economic shocks. Thus, the fact that later results are much like the 
natural experiment ﬁ  ndings also adds credence to later results that could be 
confounded by imperfect control for macro shocks.
Consider ﬁ  rst an example for Germany. Before 1972, the social security 
retirement age in Germany was sixty-  ﬁ  ve, except for disability, and there 
was no social security early retirement age. But legislation in 1972 provided 
for early retirement at age sixty for women and at age sixty-  three for men 
(given the accumulation of thirty-  ﬁ  ve required social security work years). 
In addition, increased liberal use of disability and unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
eﬀectively expanded the early retirement option. Beginning in 1972 (with 
further provisions over the next twenty years), social security early retire-
ment beneﬁ  ts were made available with no actuarial reduction in beneﬁ  ts 
available at the normal retirement age; beneﬁ  ts if taken at the early retire-
ment age were the same as if they were taken at the normal retirement age. 
Delayed beneﬁ  ts were increased only through years of service, about 2.2 per-
cent each year, well below an actuarially fair adjustment. The 1972 reform 
greatly increased the incentive to leave the labor force early. Over the next 
four years the employment rate of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four fell by 
about 7 percentage points, a decrease of over 17 percent.24        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
Looking at the unadjusted data in ﬁ  gure 5, panel A, it seems clear that this 
change could not have been motivated by an increase in the unemployment 
rate of youth, since this rate had been very low throughout the prior decade. 
The employment rate of youth had been falling in previous years, however. 
The adjusted data show essentially no change in either the unemployment 
or the employment rate over the prior six years, however.
The 1992 reform introduced actuarial adjustment of beneﬁ  ts, to be phased 
in beginning in 1998. In addition, beneﬁ  ts were based on net wages, rather 
than gross wages, which further reduced the incentive to leave the labor force. 
Since this reform reduced the incentive for older persons to leave the labor 
force, it could not have been motivated by the desire to provide jobs for the 
young by inducing older persons to leave the labor force. Indeed, the labor 
force of older persons increased following this reform. Between 1997 and 
2006, the employment rate of older persons increased from about 0.40 to 
0.49, an increase of about 23 percent.
What was the eﬀect of these reforms on the employment of youth? The 
results are shown in ﬁ  gure 21, panels A and B. Panel A shows results based 
on the unadjusted data. A 7 percentage point reduction in the employment 
rate of older persons between 1972 and 1976 was associated with a 2 percent-
age point reduction in the employment of youth, not an increase, and was 
associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate of 
youth, not a reduction. The 15 percentage point increase in the employment 
rate of older persons following the 1998 actuarial adjustment phase-  in was 
associated with no change, not a decrease, in the employment rate of youth 
and a slight reduction, not an increase, in the unemployment rate of youth. 
The results based on the adjusted data, shown in panel B, are essentially the 
same. Thus, the eﬀect of these reforms was quite inconsistent with the boxed 
economy view of the German economy.
The experience in France provides another, but somewhat more complex, 
illustration. Prior to 1972, the French normal social security retirement age 
was sixty-  ﬁ  ve and early retirement provisions were uncommon. Beginning 
in the early 1970s there was a series of reforms that provided early retire-
ment incentives, including more generous beneﬁ  ts and guaranteed income 
for persons age sixty and over who lost their jobs. The ﬁ  rst of the series of 
reforms was encoded in the Loi Boulin of 1971. A further series of reforms 
was put in place between 1977 and 1983. In 1983, age sixty became the nor-
mal retirement age.
Prior to 1972, the youth employment rate was rising and the youth unem-
ployment rate had increased only slightly. Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
1971 reform was prompted by youth employment concerns. By the time of 
the reforms beginning in 1977, however, the youth unemployment rate was 
rising and the youth employment rate had begun to fall. Even though it 
appears that the fall in youth employment and rise in youth unemployment 
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1983 reforms used the (by then) deteriorating youth employment and unem-
ployment trends to justify the reforms. That is, while the ﬁ  rst of the series of 
reforms—which induced older persons to leave the labor force—could not 
have been justiﬁ  ed by adverse trends in youth employment and unemploy-
ment, by the time of the later reforms in the series, after the youth trends had 
deteriorated on the heels of the early reforms, the deterioration was used to 
justify further inducement for older persons to retire. Thus, while the ﬁ  rst of 
the long series reforms seems exogenous with respect to youth employment, 
the exogeneity of the later reforms in the series is unclear.
Fig. 21    Response to reforms in Germany, 1972 and 1998 to 2006: A, Unadjusted 
data; B, Adjusted data
B
A26        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
In 1993, there was a reversal. The number of years of work required to 
earn full beneﬁ  ts was raised from 37.5 to forty years and the rules for com-
puting the replacement rate became less generous. It seems evident that the 
1993 reform could not have been prompted by the continuing adverse trends 
in youth employment.
Here we consider the combined eﬀects of the 1971 and subsequent 
reforms, using the period 1972 to 1993. (In the next section we compare 
reforms in France and the United Kingdom and use a somewhat diﬀerent 
range of years.)
The results of these reforms can be seen in ﬁ  gure 22, panels A and B. Panel 
A, based on unadjusted data, shows that as the employment of older persons 
fell by about 21 percentage points between 1971 and 1993, the employment 
of youth also fell by approximately an equal percent, and the youth unem-
ployment rate increased. In short, the series of reforms was very successful 
in inducing older persons to leave the labor force. But to the extent that the 
reforms were prompted by hope of providing more job opportunities for 
youth (only the later reforms in the series), they failed. There is no evidence 
that the reforms provided more jobs for youth.
On the other hand, when the employment of older persons increased 
between 1993 and 2005, the employment of youth also increased and the 
unemployment of youth declined. The adjusted employment series for 
France show substantially reduced ﬂ  uctuations in the employment trends 
over time, as can be seen by comparing the unadjusted and the adjusted 
series in ﬁ  gure 8. Nonetheless, the direction of the changes are the same 
when based on adjusted data, as shown in panel B of ﬁ  gure 22. Again, the 
results show no evidence of the boxed economy proposition.
A reform in Denmark provides a very striking example. In 1979, the Post 
Employment Wage (PEW) program was introduced. It induced an almost 
immediate 28 percent drop in the labor force participation rate of men sixty-
  one to sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Prior to the 1979 reform, the employment rate of youth 
had been increasing and the unemployment rate of youth had changed little 
since 1975. Thus, it seems unlikely that the reform was prompted by a fall in 
the employment rate or an increase in the unemployment rate of youth. The 
response to this reform is shown in panel A of ﬁ  gure 23, based on unadjusted 
data. Between 1978 and 1983 the employment rate of men sixty- one to sixty-
 ﬁ  v e   f e l l   b y   a l m o s t   2 3   p e r c e n t a g e   p o i n t s ,   a   d e c l i n e   o f   3 5   p e r c e n t .   O v e r   t h e  
same period the employment rate of all youth twenty to twenty-  four fell by 
about 4 percentage points and the unemployment rate of youth increased by 
about 4 percentage points. The results based on adjusted data are shown in 
panel B of ﬁ  gure 23 and tell the same story. Again, this “natural experiment” 
shows no evidence of the boxed economy proposition.
In short, each of these “natural experiments” is consistent one with the 
other, and none of them is consistent with the boxed economy proposi-
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Cross-  Country Estimates of the Relationship between the Employment of 
the Old and the Young
The examples in the previous section are “natural experiment” estimates 
of the eﬀects of reforms in selected countries. The results in this section are 
based on cross-  country comparisons.
Before considering comparisons across all countries, we begin by com-
paring the employment trends in two countries—the United Kingdom and 
France—and then by comparing natural experiment estimates of the 
Fig. 22    Response to reforms in France, 1971 to 1983 and 1993: A, Unadjusted 
data; B, Adjusted data
A
B28        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
responses to reform in the two countries. These two countries provide an 
illustration of the eﬀect of diﬀerences in reform on the employment of older 
persons and, in turn, on the consequent tie between the employment of older 
persons and the employment of youth.
Figure 24 is abstracted from ﬁ  gure 11.8 in the United Kingdom chap-
ter that shows trends for four age groups. Figure 24 shows employment 
trends for the sixty to sixty-  four age group only. Between 1968 and 1983, 
the trends were similar in both countries. Prior to 1972, the French normal 
social security retirement age was sixty-  ﬁ  ve and early retirement provisions 
were uncommon. In the early 1970s “early retirement provisions” were intro-
duced by way of guaranteed income for persons age sixty and over who lost 
their jobs. (Provisions to facilitate early retirement began with provisions in 
Fig. 23    Response to the 1979 reform in Denmark: A, Unadjusted data; B, 
Adjusted data
A
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speciﬁ  c industries in the private sector in the late 1960s.) In 1983, age sixty 
became the normal retirement age in France. In addition, guaranteed income 
was provided for persons age ﬁ  fty-  seven and older who lost their jobs. The 
downward trend in the employment of the sixty to sixty- four age group was 
continuous over the whole 1968 to 1983 interval in France. The downward 
trend in the United Kingdom began at the time of the 1975 State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) reform and continued until the end of the 
interval. The downward trend was also facilitated by the 1977 Job Release 
Scheme.
After 1983, however, there was a striking divergence in the trends in the 
two countries. With the 1983 reform establishing age sixty as the normal 
retirement age in France, the downward trend in the employment of older 
men in France continued and was long-  lasting, continuing until 1998. The 
eventual reversal was facilitated by the 1993 reform that increased the num-
ber of years of work required to get full beneﬁ  ts and reduced the replace-
ment rate. On the other hand, the downward trend in the United Kingdom 
changed abruptly. The Job Release Scheme was terminated in 1988. (In 
addition, private sector ﬁ  rms were converting from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t [DB] 
plans—which typically have large early retirement incentives—to deﬁ  ned 
contribution [DC] plans without such incentives. But in the late 1980s most 
older workers were not yet aﬀected by this shift.) The employment of men 
sixty to sixty- four turned upward in 1993. In essence, the diﬀerence between 
the post-  1983 trends in France and the United Kingdom arise because the 
reforms in France remained in eﬀect for many years, while the reforms in 
the United Kingdom were short-  lived.
Fig. 24    Comparison of the proportion of older men employed in the United King-
dom and in France, 1968 to 200530        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
To capture as closely as possible the diﬀerences in the reforms ongoing in 
the two countries in diﬀerent time intervals, we show data for four time peri-
ods—1971, 1983, 1993, and 2005—and the corresponding three intervals.
In the years between 1968 and the early 1970s, there was little change in 
the employment or the unemployment of youth in either country. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the early reforms in either country were prompted by decline in 
the employment or increases in the unemployment of youth in either country 
(as emphasized for France in the prior section).
Figure 25 and ﬁ  gure 26 summarize the diﬀerences in the two countries, 
both with respect to the employment of older persons and with respect to 
the employment and unemployment of the young. The comparisons in these 
Fig. 25    Comparison of employment trends in the United Kingdom and France, 
1971 to 2005, unadjusted data: A, United Kingdom; B, France
A
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ﬁ  gures are based on men only in the sixty to sixty-  four age group, but all 
youth in the twenty to twenty-  four age group.
Consider ﬁ  rst the results based on the unadjusted data in ﬁ  gure 25. In the 
years between 1971 and 1983 the employment of older persons was declin-
ing in both countries. The employment of youth was also declining in both 
countries and the unemployment of youth was increasing in both countries. 
The diﬀerences in all three trends are very similar in the two countries. But 
after 1983 when the employment trends of older persons diverged in the 
two countries, the employment trends for young persons also diverged. In 
the United Kingdom, with only a small decline in the employment of older 
men between 1983 and 1993, there was little change in the employment and 
Fig. 26    Comparison of employment trends in the United Kingdom and France, 
1971 to 2005, adjusted data: A, United Kingdom; B, France
A
B32        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
4. In prior phases of the project, we emphasized the dramatic decline in the labor force 
participation of men sixty to sixty-  four between the 1960s and the mid-  1990s (Gruber and 
Wise 1999). We also emphasized the reversal to an increase in the labor force participation of 
men sixty to sixty-  four in most of the countries beginning in the mid-  1990s and noted that the 
increase could be attributed to speciﬁ  c reforms in many countries (Gruber and Wise 2007). Here 
we focus on men and women combined and on a broader age interval, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four 
for all persons, instead of sixty to sixty-  four for men.
unemployment of youth during this period. Between 1993 and 2005, the 
employment of men increased substantially and there was an increase in the 
employment and a decrease in the unemployment of youth. On the other 
hand, in France, where the employment of the older group continued to 
decline, the employment of youth also declined substantially. The employ-
ment of men continued to decline in the United Kingdom until 1998 but 
then began to increase. By 2005 the employment of youth had increased 
substantially and the unemployment of youth had declined slightly.
The results based on the adjusted data are shown in ﬁ  gure 26. The general 
pattern of change in both countries is the same as the pattern based on 
the unadjusted data. For both the United Kingdom and France, however, 
the trends in the adjusted data diﬀer substantially from the trends in the 
unadjusted data, as shown in ﬁ  gure 8, panel A. The adjusted data suggest, 
for example, that in both countries much of the fall in the employment of 
older men between 1971 and 1983 may be explained by macro shocks to 
the economies; the diﬀerences in the adjusted trends are smaller than the 
diﬀerences in the unadjusted trends in both countries. By 2005, the adjusted 
data show a substantial increase in the employment of older men in both 
countries and a corresponding increase in the employment and a decrease 
in the unemployment of youth in both countries.
Like the previous country- speciﬁ  c examples, this comparison shows natural 
experiment-  like estimates of the eﬀect of the reforms in each country on the 
employment of older persons and on the relationship between the employment 
of the old and the young. These diﬀerences between the employment trends in 
the two countries correspond closely to the diﬀerences in their reforms. The 
ﬁ  ndings are clearly inconsistent with the boxed economy proposition.
Now consider a comparison across all participating countries. In each 
of the twelve countries, the employment of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four 
increased over the last ten or ﬁ  fteen years.4 This can be seen in ﬁ  gures 3 to 
14 in section 2. In most countries, the increase began between the mid- 1980s 
and the mid- 1990s, but the beginning date varied from country to country—
between 1983 in the United States and 1999 in Italy. In many countries the 
increase can be ascribed to a particular reform that limited early retirement, 
as illustrated in some of the previous country- speciﬁ  c illustrations. But even 
if a precipitating reform cannot be narrowly identiﬁ  ed, it is implausible that 
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of older persons was motivated by a desire to increase the employment—
or reduce the unemployment—of youth. Thus, these increases provide a 
good natural experiment—not plagued by the endogeneity problem—to 
judge the eﬀect of the increase in the employment of older persons on the 
employment of youth.
The results are presented in a series of ﬁ  gures. Most of the ﬁ  gures are 
based on adjusted data, although some comparison ﬁ  gures are shown for 
unadjusted data as well. Figure 27 shows the diﬀerence in the employment 
rate of older persons from the beginning of the upturn to the end of the 
data in each country, together with the diﬀerence in the employment and 
unemployment rate of youth. The countries are ordered by the increase in 
the employment of older persons, from least to greatest. It is apparent that a 
greater increase in the employment of older persons is not associated with a 
decrease in the employment of youth and is not associated with an increase 
in the unemployment of youth. On average, across all countries the increase 
in the employment of older persons is 8.1 percentage points, the increase in 
the employment of youth is 4.7 percentage points, and the decrease in the 
unemployment of youth is 2.6 percentage points.
Figure 28 shows the ﬁ  t of the relationship between the employment of 
older persons and the employment of youth. Figure 29 shows the ﬁ  t of the 
relationship between the employment of older persons and the unemploy-
ment of youth. It is clear that if anything, the relationship to youth employ-
ment is slightly positive and the relationship to youth unemployment slightly 
negative. A boxed economy view would suggest exactly the opposite.
Fig. 27    Change in the employment of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four and in the em-
ployment and unemployment of persons twenty to twenty-  four, from beginning of 
last upturn in ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment to data end, adjusted data34        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
Figure 30 compares the six countries (in ﬁ  gure 27) with the least increase 
to the six countries with the greatest increase in the employment of the old. 
The six countries with the greatest increase in the employment of the old had 
the greatest increase in the employment of youth and the greatest decrease 
in the unemployment of youth.
Because the change in youth employment depends in part on when the 
Fig. 28    Relationship between the increase in ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment 
and twenty to twenty-  four employment, from beginning of last upturn in ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to 
sixty-  four employment to data end, adjusted data
Fig. 29    Relationship between the increase in ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment 
and twenty to twenty-  four unemployment, from beginning of last upturn in ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  four employment to data end, adjusted dataIntroduction and Summary    3 5
5. France is excluded from the average ratio for unemployment of youth because the adjusted 
unemployment rate for France declined from a positive to a negative value between the begin-
ning and end of the period. Japan is excluded for the same reason.
6. The ratio averages for youth unemployment exclude France, Germany, and Japan because 
the adjusted unemployment values for these countries go from positive values at the beginning 
of the period to negative values at the end of the period.
upturn for older persons began, we have scaled the diﬀerences by the ratio 
of the value at the end of the period (the last observation in the data) to the 
value at the beginning of the upturn. Using this measure, the six countries 
with the least increase are compared to the six with the greatest increase in 
ﬁ  gure 31. Based on this measure, there is essentially no diﬀerence between 
change in the employment and unemployment of youth in the two groups 
of countries.5
As a further check on the comparison, consider the change over the same 
time period for all countries—1995 to 2003. Again, the six countries with 
the least increase are compared with the six with the greatest increase in 
the employment of older workers. Figure 32 shows the results measured in 
diﬀerences and ﬁ  gure 33 the results measured in ratios.6 Both measures show 
that the six countries with the greatest increase in employment of the older 
group had a slightly greater increase in the employment of youth. Based 
on either measure, the diﬀerence in the unemployment of youth was close 
to zero. Based on the ratio measure (ﬁ  gure 10), a 1 percent increase in the 
employment of older persons leads to a 0.51 percent increase in the employ-
ment of youth and a 0.06 percent decline in the unemployment of youth. 
Based on the diﬀerence measure (ﬁ  gure 9), a 1 percentage point increase in 
the employment of older persons leads to a 0.173 percentage point increase 
Fig. 30    Comparison of the six countries with the least to the six with the greatest 
increase in the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment, from beginning of last upturn in 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment, adjusted data—diﬀerence36        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
in the employment of youth and a 0.036 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment of youth. (These estimates can be compared to panel regres-
sion estimates shown later.)
Thus we conclude that based on this comparison, there is no evidence 
that increasing the employment of older persons reduces the employment, 
or increases the unemployment, of youth.
The other side of the comparison of upturns across countries is the com-
parison of downturns. Most downturns were long- terms and occurred prior 
to the upturns discussed before, as can be seen in ﬁ  gures 3 to 14 in section 2. 
One country has two separate downturn intervals and we consider both. As 
Fig. 31    Comparison of the six countries with the least to the six with the greatest 
increase in the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment, from beginning of last upturn in 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment to data end, adjusted data—ratio
Fig. 32    Comparison of the six countries with the least and the greatest increase in 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment, 1995 to 2003 in each country, adjusted data—
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already shown, many of the downturns were precipitated by speciﬁ  c reforms, 
or by a series of reforms. In this case, we compare the countries with the 
greatest decreases with the countries with the smallest decreases. We show 
results based on the ratio measure only. The results are shown in ﬁ  gures 34 
and 35 for unadjusted and adjusted data, respectively. The ﬁ  gures show the 
averages over the six countries with the smallest decreases in the employment 
of older persons and the average over the seven “countries” with the greatest 
decreases—the seven instead of six—to indicate that one country had two 
separate downward intervals.
Both ﬁ  gures show that the countries with the greatest decline in the 
employment of the older age group have the greatest decline in the employ-
ment of the young as well. The diﬀerences are somewhat smaller when based 
on the adjusted data.
Like the previous results, these comparisons show no evidence that reduc-
tions in the employment of older persons provides more job opportunities 
for the young. The results are inconsistent with the boxed economy proposi-
tion.
Panel Regression Estimates
Perhaps the most common way to summarize data series across many 
countries is by way of panel regression estimation. The panel estimates allow 
control for country-  speciﬁ  c attributes that aﬀect the employment and the 
unemployment of the young, but that are not included as covariates in the 
analysis. Although this method presents a concise estimate of results, it is 
subject to several limitations. First, taken on its own, this method masks the 
results of “natural experiments” like those discussed previously. Second, in 
Fig. 33    Comparison of the six countries with the least and the greatest increase in 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four employment, 1995 to 2003 in each country, adjusted data—
ratio 2003/  199538        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
the simple speciﬁ  cation we have used, the eﬀect of covariates is presumed 
to be the same in all countries. The results based on adjusted data, pre-
sented before, allow the eﬀects of the covariates on each of the employment 
time series to vary from country to country. It is clear that the eﬀect of the 
covariates diﬀers from country to country. Third, judging by the “natural 
experiment” segments in the data, it seems evident that the most relevant 
year intervals for comparison—whether diﬀerences, or percent changes, or 
another measure—are not common to all countries.
We present panel estimates based on several diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations. The 
Fig. 34    Comparison of countries with the greatest and least declines in E ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  four, ratio—unadjusted data
Fig. 35    Comparison of countries with the least and greatest declines in E ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  four, ratio—adjusted dataIntroduction and Summary    3 9
method followed is set out in detail in the appendix. The key right- hand vari-
able is the employment rate of persons ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve to sixty- four. We also control 
directly for GDP, the growth in GDP, and the proportion of the economy in 
manufacturing. In addition we include country- speciﬁ  c eﬀects, which control 
for country-  speciﬁ  c attributes that, in addition to the covariates, aﬀect the 
employment and the unemployment of youth. We also include year eﬀects 
that capture attributes that are common to all countries in a given year.
The results are shown in table 1. The table shows the estimated eﬀect of 
the employment of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four on the unemployment 
and the employment of youth twenty to twenty- four, and on the unemploy-
ment and employment of prime-  age persons twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four. The 
table also shows the estimated eﬀect of the employment of older persons 
on the proportion of youth in school. Estimates are reported for several 
speciﬁ  cations. The ﬁ  rst is “levels,” which means that levels of employment 
and unemployment rates are regressed on contemporaneous levels of the 
Table 1  Panel estimates of the eﬀect of the LFP of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four 
on the unemployment rate, employment rate, and schooling of younger 
persons
Youth 20 to 24 Prime age 25 to 54
Speciﬁ  cation   UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.367 0.663 –0.451 –0.267 0.279
(0.039) (0.076) (0.073) (0.019) (0.042)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
–0.092 0.321 –0.391 –0.158 0.065
(0.044) (0.084) (0.073) (0.023) (0.046)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.437 0.835 –0.285 –0.282 0.466
(0.062) (0.078) (0.053) (0.030) (0.037)
5-  year log diﬀerence –1.868 0.611 –0.721 –2.186 0.238
(0.268) (0.063) (0.160) (0.253) (0.021)
With controls
Levels –0.232 0.912 –0.911 –0.191 0.416
(0.055) (0.090) (0.094) (0.027) (0.053)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.110 0.541 –0.804 –0.056 0.136
(0.056) (0.098) (0.089) (0.029) (0.057)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.193 0.573 –0.179 –0.115 0.288
(0.081) (0.094) (0.072) (0.039) (0.044)
5-  year log diﬀerence –0.905 0.486 –0.619 –0.960 0.144
(0.329)   (0.090)   (0.240)   (0.260)   (0.028)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on elderly employment. Controls include GDP per capita, 
growth in GDP per capita, and manf. share. Each speciﬁ  cation also includes country ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects and year ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Levels regression means that we regress levels on levels. 3- year lag 
means that we regress the dependent variable on a 3-  year lag of elderly employment. 5-  year 
diﬀerence means that we take 5th diﬀerences for the RHS and the LHS variables. 5-  year log 
diﬀerence means that we take the log of each X and Y variable, then take 5-  year diﬀerences. 
UE   unemployment rate; EMP   employment rate; SCH   schooling.40        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
explanatory variables, including the employment rate of persons ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  four. The second is “3-  year lag,” which means that the employment 
and unemployment rates of youth and prime-  age persons in a given year 
are regressed on the employment of older persons three years earlier. (The 
other covariates are measured in the same year as the youth and prime-
 age employment and unemployment rates.) The third is “5- year diﬀerence,” 
which means that we consider, for example, the diﬀerence between youth 
unemployment in a given year to youth unemployment ﬁ  ve years earlier. We 
relate this diﬀerence to the comparable ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence in employment 
of older persons, and ﬁ  ve- year diﬀerence in the other explanatory variables. 
The fourth speciﬁ  cation is “5-  year log diﬀerence,” which is the same as the 
third speciﬁ  cation, but the logarithm of unemployment, for example, in a 
given year is compared to the logarithm of unemployment ﬁ  ve years earlier. 
In this case, the estimates represent the percent diﬀerence in the unemploy-
ment of youth associated with a percent diﬀerence in the employment of 
older persons.
Estimates are shown with and without controlling for the covariates—
GDP per capita, growth in GDP, and the manufacturing proportion.
The key result is that in each speciﬁ  cation but one, an increase in the 
employment of older persons is estimated to decrease the unemployment 
rate of youth (and prime age persons) and to increase the employment rate 
of youth (and prime-  age persons). Each estimate is statistically diﬀerent 
from zero. The only estimate that does not follow this pattern is the estimated 
eﬀect of employment of older persons on the unemployment rate of youth 
in the “3-  year lag on elderly” speciﬁ  cation, with controls. And in this case, 
the estimated eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
More precisely, with respect to the unemployment of youth the estimates 
for youth suggest this: with controls, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
employment of older persons changes the unemployment rate of youth 
between  0.11 and –0.23 percentage points. Without controls the decrease 
is between 0.09 and 0.44 percentage points. For the log diﬀerence speciﬁ  ca-
tion with controls, a 1 percent increase in the employment of older persons is 
associated with a 0.91 percent decrease in the unemployment rate of youth. 
Without controls the decrease is 1.87 percent.
With respect to the employment of youth: with controls, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the employment of older persons increases the employment 
rate of youth between 0.54 and 0.91 percentage points. Without controls the 
increase is between 0.32 and 0.84 percentage points. For the log diﬀerence 
speciﬁ  cation with controls, a 1 percent increase in the employment of older 
persons is associated with a 0.49 percent increase in the unemployment rate 
of youth. Without controls the increase is 0.61 percent. Comparable esti-
mates for prime-  age persons can be seen in the table.
The estimates for each speciﬁ  cation also indicate that an increase in the 
employment of older persons is associated with a decrease in the schooling Introduction and Summary    4 1
of youth, and each of these estimates is signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero. 
Across all speciﬁ  cations, a 1 percentage point increase in the employment 
of older persons reduces the proportion of youth in school by between 
0.17 and 0.70 percentage points. A 1 percent increase in the employment 
of older persons is associated with about a 0.70 percent reduction in the 
proportion of youth twenty to twenty-  four in school. This result is con-
sistent with ﬁ  ndings elsewhere that the greater the employment rate of 
youth (or the greater the opportunity for employment) the lower school 
attendance will be.
In short, the panel regression results are consistent with the “natural 
experiment” results as well as the results based on increasing and decreas-
ing employment intervals for older persons. The ﬁ  ndings provide no support 
for the boxed economy proposition. Indeed, the weight of the evidence sug-
gests that increasing the employment of older persons provides more job 
opportunities for younger persons and reduces the unemployment rate of 
younger persons. The positive relationship is, of course, not consistent with 
the boxed economy proposition. We have not, however, emphasized the pos-
sible mechanisms—such as lower earnings tax rates—that could produce 
the positive relationship.
Summary and Conclusions
In this volume, we direct attention to the oft-  claimed proposition that 
incentives to induce older persons to retire—inherent in the provisions of 
social security systems—were prompted by youth unemployment. And that 
if the incentives to retire were removed, and older persons stayed longer in 
the labor force, the job opportunities of youth would be reduced. We ﬁ  nd no 
evidence to support this boxed economy proposition. We ﬁ  nd no evidence 
that increasing the labor force participation of older persons reduces the job 
opportunities of young persons. Indeed, the evidence suggests that greater 
labor force participation of older persons is associated with greater youth 
employment and with reduced youth unemployment.
The results shown in this summary are based on data from the individual 
country papers. Some of the data in the papers was borrowed to use in 
natural experiment illustrations. The data from all of the country papers 
was also pooled to obtain estimates based on the collective information from 
all of the countries combined. We began the introduction by showing that 
the enormous waves of women entering the labor force over the past several 
decades varied substantially across countries and were unrelated to the small 
changes in the labor force participation of men across countries.
We ask whether the economic world might be diﬀerent for young versus 
old employees. We presented results based on several diﬀerent methods of 
inference. A striking feature of the results is the strong similarity of the ﬁ  nd-
ings based on these quite diﬀerent methods of estimation.42        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
In short, the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as well as the evi-
dence from each of the several diﬀerent methods of estimation, is contrary 
to the boxed economy proposition. We ﬁ  nd no evidence that increasing the 
employment of older persons will reduce the employment opportunities of 
youth and no evidence that increasing the employment of older persons will 
increase the unemployment of youth.
Appendix
Adjusted Data
We want to adjust the employment series for macro changes that may 
aﬀect each of the employment series. The variables we use to make the ad-
justment are GDP per capita, growth in GDP, and the percent of the econ-
omy in manufacturing. This is the procedure we follow: suppose the employ-
ment series is Y and the adjuster variables are X1, X2, and X3. Then, for each 
series in each country we estimate
Yt    0    1X1t    1X1t    1X1t   εt,
and obtain the estimated values  1,  2, and  3. We let the ﬁ  rst year, Y1, of 
each employment series be the base. Then each subsequent year is adjusted 
based on the change in the X variables between period 1 and period t. The 
adjusted value of Y in period t is given by
Y(A)t   Yt    1(X1t   X11)    2(X2t   X21)    3(X3t   X31).
Panel Estimates
We follow a standard panel estimation procedure, with
Y(20 24)it    0    1(E55 64)it    2Xit   ci   yt   uit,
where i indexes countries and t indexes years, Y is youth employment or 
youth unemployment (or prime age employment or unemployment, or 
schooling), X represents the covariates, the ci are country-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects, and 
the yt are year eﬀects. As explained in the text, we estimate several diﬀerent 
speciﬁ  cations of this general model.
Incentive to Leave the Labor Force
The text presents the results of several diﬀerent ways to assess the eﬀect 
of the employment of older persons on the employment of youth. In prin-
ciple, this approach provides an all-  inclusive estimate of the relationship 
between the employment rates of the two groups. In particular, in addition 
to the strong relationship between the provisions of social security programs 
and the labor force participation of older workers—which has been demon-Introduction and Summary    4 3
strated in earlier phases of the project—the employment of older workers 
depends on other economic inﬂ  uences as well. For example, macroeconomic 
shocks to the economy can aﬀect the employment of older persons, as can be 
seen in the comparison of the unadjusted and adjusted employment trends 
in each of the countries.
Much public discussion, however, is focused on the need for the incentives 
to induce older persons to retire so that the job prospects for younger people 
will be improved. This is often used both as an explanation for the introduc-
tion to the incentive in the ﬁ  rst place and, now, as a reason for not removing 
the incentives. Thus, we believe it would be useful to present evidence on 
the direct relationship between the incentives for older persons to leave the 
labor force and the employment of youth. We approached this question by 
calculating a time series index of the average incentives faced by persons 
who were retired in each year.
The index, as well as potential estimation methods, is described below. In 
practice, however, the approach was not replicable across countries. There 
are several possible reasons for this. One reason is that it is unclear whether 
an accurate measure of the incentives faced by all persons retired in a year 
can be obtained. A second reason is that even if an accurate average can be 
calculated, the average may not be suﬃcient; it is the broad range of incen-
tives faced by individuals that matters. The extremes may be more important 
than the average, for example. We have shown in earlier phases of the project 
that the incentives faced by individuals matter.
The incentive faced by persons of age a in year y is given by
I(a, y)   {W(a, y)    [W(a, y)   PV(a, y)]} q(a, y).
Here, W(a, y) is the social security wealth (the present discounted value of 
future beneﬁ  ts) that a person would receive at age a in year y and q(a, y) is 
a weight explained following; [W(a, y) – PV(a, y)] is the gain that could be 
obtained if a person delayed retirement to the age at which beneﬁ  ts would 
be at their “peak value” PV(a, y).
Persons who are retired in a given year are diﬀerent ages and the incen-
tive they faced when approaching retirement depends on the person’s age at 
that time. So to get the average incentive, we must average over the ages of 
persons retired in year y. Here we assume, for illustration, that the possible 
ages are from ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine. The youngest, age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, is assumed 
to be the earliest age that any beneﬁ  ts are available. Now the average for year 
y is obtained by weighting each age by the proportion of persons that age.











a 55 P(a, y) [I(a, y)].
But we do not know at what age a person retired. A person who is ﬁ  fty- nine, 
for example, could have retired at ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  fty-  six, ﬁ  fty-  seven, ﬁ  fty-  eight, 
or ﬁ  fty-  nine. A person who is ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve must have retired at ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve. Thus 44        Jonathan Gruber, Kevin Milligan, and David A. Wise
we must consider the incentive the person would have faced at each of the 
possible ages the person could have retired. If the person is ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, there 
is only one term in the second bracket. If the person is ﬁ  fty-  nine, there are 
ﬁ  ve terms.
If the weight given to age a in year y is q(a, y), then the average can be 
written as


















 I(a   t, y   t) 
q(a   t, y   t)







0q(a   t, y   t) .
If accurate, this could be interpreted as “the tax force to retire” that was 
faced by persons who were observed to be retired in year y, the term we 
used to describe the incentive to retire faced by persons between the early 
retirement age and age sixty- nine in phase one of the project, and as used in 
section 3 in this introduction.
Now we need to determine an appropriate way to approximate the relative 
weight to give to each possible age of retirement. We assume that the weight 
is proportional to the proportion of persons in the labor force in the year 
before the retirement age. That is, the assumption is that the likelihood that 
a person faced a particular incentive depends on the proportion of persons 
in the labor force the year before the person attained that age. If, for example, 
as the labor force participation (LFP) was declining over the years the person 
aged from ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine, we assume that the person was most likely 
to face the incentive appropriate to ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, less likely to face the incentive 
appropriate to ﬁ  fty-  six, and so forth. Now we have
q(a   t, y   t)   LFP(a   t, y   t   1),
and

































I(a   t, y   t)   {1 • W(a   t, y   t)     • [W(a   t, y   t) 
    PV(a   t, y   t)]}.
To estimate    I  (  y  )   we need to determine  ; that is, we need to determine the 
relative weight given to the two components of the index. Suppose we set 
the weight on W(a – t, y – t) equal to 1, as set out in the previous equation. 
Then we need only determine the relative weight   on [W(a – t, y – t) – 
PV(a – t, y – t)]. There are at least two ways to do this. One way is to regress Introduction and Summary    4 5
the proportion of older persons in the labor force in a year on the index    I  (  y  )  , 
where the index value is based on diﬀerent values of  , and then choose the 
  that maximizes the regression r- squared  value.
Estimation can also be based on independently estimated averages of the 
two components of the index I. The two components are











a 55 P(a, y) 







0 W(a   t, y   t) · LFP(a   t, y   t   1)







0 LFP(a   t, y   t   1)  











a 55 P(a, y) 







0 [ W(a   t, y   t)   PV(a   t, y   t)] · LFP(a   t, y   t   1)







0 LFP(a   t, y   t   1)  .
Notice that these means are obtained by calculating the measures at the 
individual age-  year levels and then averaging over the individual age-  year 
measures. In this case, the value of   is determined by a time series regression 
of the labor force participation of older workers on these two components, 
setting the coeﬃcient on W  (y) equal to 1 and estimating the   coeﬃcient 
on    [  W     –     P  V  ]  (y).
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